

Relativized Succinct Arguments in the ROM Do Not Exist

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Bocconi


EPFL



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Succinct non-interactive arguments

SNARGs in the ROM



Random oracle $\mathcal{O} := \{\mathcal{O}_\ell\}_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}}$

uniform distribution over all functions $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$

Completeness: \forall instance-generating adversary A ,


$$\Pr \left[x \in L \wedge V^f(x, \pi) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ x \leftarrow A^f \\ \pi \leftarrow P^f(x) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Soundness: \forall query-bounded and time-bounded adversary \tilde{P} ,

$$\Pr \left[x \notin L \wedge V^f(x, \tilde{\pi}) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ (x, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^f \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

What is a relativized argument in the ROM?

Relativization: The language L is **relativized**, $L = \{L_f : f \in \mathcal{O}\}$. e.g. $L_f := \{(x, y) : y = f(x)\}$



Random oracle $\mathcal{O} := \{\mathcal{O}_\ell\}_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}}$

uniform distribution over all functions $f: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$

Completeness: \forall instance-generating adversary A ,

$$\Pr \left[x \in L_f \wedge V^f(x, \pi) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ x \leftarrow A^f \\ \pi \leftarrow P^f(x) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$


Soundness: \forall query-bounded and time-bounded adversary \tilde{P} ,

$$\Pr \left[x \notin L_f \wedge V^f(x, \tilde{\pi}) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} f \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ (x, \tilde{\pi}) \leftarrow \tilde{P}^f \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon.$$

Why study relativized arguments? [1/2]

Motivation 1: Verifiable distributed computation

Distributed computation, blockchains, etc.
(Incrementally verifiable computation, Proof-carrying data)



$$\text{CSAT}_f := \{(C, x) : \exists w, C^f(x, w) = 1\}$$

How does Bob produce π_B ?

Let $\text{ARG} = (P, V)$ be a SNARG for relativized CSAT:

Oracle recursive circuit $\mathcal{C}^f(\phi_B, (\phi_A, \pi_A))$

- Check that ϕ_B is correct;
- Check that $V^f(\mathcal{C}, \phi_A, \pi_A) = 1$.

$$\pi_B \leftarrow P^f(\mathcal{C}, \phi_B, (\phi_A, \pi_A))$$

Why study relativized arguments? [2/2]

Motivation 2: Efficiency

Recurring cryptographic computations show up a lot:

- Correctness proof of encryption/decryption, signature verification, **hash function**, etc.

e.g. $L_s := \{(n, y) \in \mathbb{N} \times \{0,1\}^{|s|} : \exists x \in \{0,1\}^s, H_s^{(n)}(x) = y\}$

hash function

Necessary to construct hash function with small size??

SNARGs for L_s are expensive ($|\text{circuit that iteratively applies } H_s \text{ for } n \text{ times}| = \Omega(n |H_s|)$).

Potential alternative route:

- Treat the hash function as an oracle.
- Relativized arguments do not depend on complexity of the hash functions. 🥳

If $\text{NP}^{H_s} \subseteq \text{ARG}^{H_s}$, SNARGs for L_s do not depend on $|H_s|$

More generally, relativization removes the need for optimizing the recurring sub-computation.

Do relativized SNARGs exist in oracle models? **Yes!**

Existing relativized SNARGs

Relativized SNARGs exist in some oracle models:

- Signed random oracle model (SROM) [CT10]
- Low-degree random oracle (LDROM) [CCS22]
- Arithmetized random oracle model (AROM) [CCGOS23]

Hard to instantiate!

How about the random oracle model?

Popular belief: **No.**

Popular intuition: Relativized PCPs/IOPs do not exist in the ROM [CL20].

Counterexample to popular belief:

- Relativized PCPs/IOPs **do not exist** in the LDROM [CL20].
- Relativized SNARGs **exist** in the LDROM [CCS22].

Our results

Relativized arguments in the random oracle model do not exist.

verifier query complexity to the RO

Trivial Baseline 1. $\text{DTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t] \subseteq \text{ARG}^{\mathcal{O}}[\overset{\uparrow}{vq} = t]$.

Verifier computes everything itself.

Theorem 1. $\text{DTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t] \not\subseteq \text{ARG}^{\mathcal{O}}[vq = o(t)]$.

argument proof size

Trivial Baseline 2. $\text{NTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t] \subseteq \text{ARG}^{\mathcal{O}}[\overset{\uparrow}{as} = t]$.

Prover sends the entire witness.

Theorem 2. $\text{NTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t] \not\subseteq \text{ARG}^{\mathcal{O}}[as = o(t)]$.

Existence of IVC/PCD in the ROM still remains open.

Corollary. Relativized IVC/PCD does not exist in the ROM!

Note.

- The results hold for SNARGs secure against query-bounded and time-bounded adversaries.
- Similar results hold for interactive arguments.

Separation between NTIME and ARG

Hard language in $\text{NTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t]$

Lemma.

There exists $L_{\mathcal{O}}$ such that $L_{\mathcal{O}} \in \text{NTIME}^{\mathcal{O}}[t]$ and $L_{\mathcal{O}} \notin \text{ARG}^{\mathcal{O}}[\text{as} = o(t)]$.

argument proof size

$$L_{\mathcal{O}} := \{L_f : f \in \mathcal{O}\}$$

$$L_f := \left\{ x \in \{0,1\}^n : \begin{array}{l} x = 0^n \\ \wedge \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}, \forall i \in [t(n)], f(w \parallel i)_1 = 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

	$w \parallel 1$	$w \parallel 2$	$w \parallel 3$	$w \parallel 4$	$w \parallel 5$	
f	1000	0101	1111	0000	0010	$x \notin L_f$
f	0001	0111	0110	0111	0110	$x \in L_f$

Why is L_f hard?

- Needs $t(n)$ queries to be sure that $x \in L_f$ or not.
- Flipping even one bit of f could change the membership of x .

	$w \parallel 1$	$w \parallel 2$	$w \parallel 3$	$w \parallel 4$	$w \parallel 5$	
f	1000	0101	0100	0000	0010	$x \notin L_f$
f'	0000	0101	0100	0000	0010	$x \in L_f$

Proof outline

$$L_f := \left\{ x \in \{0,1\}^n : \begin{array}{l} x = 0^n \\ \wedge \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}, \forall i \in [t(n)], f(w||i)_1 = 0 \end{array} \right\}$$

1. Fix $x := 0^n$ for some n .
2. Consider $f^\star \in \mathcal{O}$ such that $x \notin L_{f^\star}$.
3. For every $w \in \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$, define f_w to be f^\star , except that $f_w(w||i)_1 = 0$ for every $i \in [t(n)]$.
 - $f_w \in \mathcal{O}$.
 - $x \in L_{f_w}$.

	$w 1$	$w 2$	$w 3$	$w 4$	$w 5$
f^\star	1001	0111	1110	0000	1010
f_w	0001	0111	0110	0000	0010

Intuition: without a long argument string, argument verifier cannot make meaningful queries!

4. **Claim***: For every $f \in \mathcal{O}$, there exists a large set $Q_f \subseteq \{0,1\}^{t(n)}$ such that

$$\forall w \in Q_f, \forall i \in [t(n)], \Pr[V(x) \text{ queries } f \text{ at } w||i] \text{ is small.}$$
5. Soundness of ARG + $x \notin L_{f^\star} \implies \Pr[V^{f^\star}(x, \pi_{f^\star}) = 1]$ is small for efficiently generated π_{f^\star} .
6. Point 4 $\implies \forall w \in Q_{f^\star}, \Pr[V^{f_w}(x, \pi_{f^\star}) = 1] \approx \Pr[V^{f^\star}(x, \pi_{f^\star}) = 1]$.
7. Point 5 + 6 $\implies \forall w \in Q_{f^\star}, \Pr[V^{f_w}(x, \pi_{f^\star}) = 1]$ is small, contradicting completeness of ARG.

Discussion and open problems

Low-degree random oracle model

Low-degree random oracle (LDROM) $\mathcal{P} := \{\mathcal{P}_\ell\}_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}}$

\mathcal{P}_ℓ is the uniform distribution over all polynomials $f: \mathbb{F}_{q(\ell)}^{n(\ell)} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{q(\ell)}$ of individual degree at most $d(\ell)$.

Open problem 1. Rule out relativized SNARGs in the LDROM, secure against **query-bounded** adversaries.

[CCS22] construction:
 Relativized SNARGs in the LDROM
 secure against **query-bounded and time-bounded** adversaries


Do they exist or not??

Our proof:
 Can't generalize, no guarantee that $f_w \in \mathcal{P}[q, d]$.

	$w 1$	$w 2$	$w 3$	$w 4$	$w 5$
f^*	1001	0111	1110	0000	1010
f_w	0001	0111	0110	0000	0010

[CL20] impossibility:
 No relativized PCPs in the LDROM
 (PCPs are common subroutines in SNARGs constructions)
 Caveat: only proved it for specific $f \in \mathcal{P}[q, d]$,
 instead of a uniformly sampled $f \leftarrow \mathcal{P}[q, d]$

Characterization




Open problem 2.

Give a sufficient and necessary condition for an oracle that separates $\text{DTIME}/\text{NTIME}$ and relativized arguments.

Insights into Fiat-Shamir



SOMETIMES INSECURE!
Diagonalization attacks: [GK03;CGH04;BBHMR19;KRS25]



Proven secure in the ROM
Natural class of white-box attacks “relativize”
(FS[relativized protocol] is insecure in the ROM)
 \implies XFS is secure against many existing attacks

Is Fiat-Shamir transformation secure in other oracle models? LDRM? AROM?

Thank you!

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